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In Chapter 3 of Ethics for Enemies, Frances Kamm offers a 
characteristically thoughtful and provocative discussion of how 
intentions should figure in determining whether a nation’s act of 
war is morally permissible. From within a deontological 
conception of morality, she aims to establish that a nation can 
rightly commence a war for the wrong reasons. More precisely, she 
argues that a war launched for a morally inadequate reason is 
nonetheless morally permissible if: (1) initiating and properly 
prosecuting the war will achieve a goal that would be a just cause 
for war; (2) the nation that initiates the war knows that the goal 
will be achieved through the war; and (3) the nation acts on the 
condition that the goal will be achieved.1  
What would such a case look like? Here is Kamm’s primary 
example. Germany launches a genocidal war against Norway. 
Leaders of the imagined nation of Weden in turn launch a war 
against Germany that defeats the German invasion. Weden’s 
leaders knew at the outset that their intervention would prevent 
the genocide. Moreover, if the intervention did not promise to halt 
the genocide, they would not have intervened. Still, they did not 
launch the war for this purpose. Their goal was instead to obtain 
access to cheap oil that would otherwise be unavailable to them, or 
to kill certain civilians whom they would otherwise not be entitled 
to kill. The cessation of genocide mattered to them only because it 
provided a fig leaf that would spare Weden from suffering adverse 
consequences in the international arena.  
Kamm maintains that Weden’s leaders have acted in a 
morally permissible manner because the cessation of genocide is a 
just cause for war, because the leaders knew that their act of war 
would halt the genocide, and because the cessation of the genocide 
was a necessary condition of their decision to go to war.2 To cast 
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1 Frances M. Kamm, Ethics for Enemies: Terror, Torture and War 
(2011), 119–20. 
2 Ibid., 122. Kamm adds a further condition to render Weden’s 
war morally permissible, namely that civilians not be killed by Weden  
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Weden as a wrongdoer, Kamm suggests, is to confuse moral per-
missibility with virtue. Weden’s leaders deserve no plaudits or 
parades,3 but they have done nothing wrong.  
Kamm’s aspiration, we gather, is to offer an account of the 
morality of war that avoids two extremes. One is a too-crude ends-
justifies-the-means consequentialism. The other is a too-exacting 
deontology that ties acceptable conduct to pristine intentions of a 
sort one is unlikely to encounter in decisions to go to war. We 
sympathize with the posited aspiration to locate this middle 
ground. Still, we are not yet convinced that Kamm has found the 
moral sweet spot, and in this comment we will try to articulate the 
basis for our doubts. As our expertise is law, not moral philosophy, 
our aim is modest. We seek to show how certain facets of domestic 
and international law might pose challenges to Kamm’s argument. 
We will first consider how domestic law addresses individual 
behavioral analogs to the kind of state behavior with which Kamm 
is concerned. We then turn to state behavior and the law of war.  
Our analysis proceeds on the assumption that law has the 
potential to shed light on morality in two opposing ways. Legal 
rules and principles governing the use of force are frequently 
shaped by the same considerations that undergird moral rules and 
principles governing the use of force – for example, considerations 
of liberty of action and security against harm. The illegality of 
uses of force subject to legal rules of this sort can thus support an 
inference as to their immorality. But it is also the case that legal 
rules are sometimes deliberately crafted to assess conduct 
independently of considerations that would ordinarily figure in 
moral deliberation. In such instances, the legality of conduct 
might tell us little about its moral permissibility, or might even 
point toward its moral impermissibility.  
 
I. Individual Analogs: Criminal and Tort Law  
Kamm’s discussion is obviously focused on states. And it may 
be that her account of morally permissible conduct better fits state 
action than individual action (though she does not press this 
point). Yet her assessment of states’ conduct turns on the 
attribution of intentions to them. As intentions are most naturally 
attributed to individuals, it is appropriate to consider analogs in 
                                                                                                                                                 
in any other manner or to any greater degree than would occur as a 
side-effect of a well-intentioned and properly executed military 
intervention. 
3 Ibid., 121 (noting in relation to a variant on this example that 
“Weden may be entitled to no gratitude for intervention”).  
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individual behavior to the sort of state behavior with which Kamm 
is concerned.  
 
1.1  Intentionality and the Legality of Violence  
   among  Individuals.   
Suppose that Roger and Rafa are fierce rivals on the tennis 
court. Indeed, Roger harbors an intense hatred for Rafa because 
Rafa consistently defeats Roger. One evening, Roger happens to 
see Rafa assaulting a third person, whom Roger does not know. No 
one other than Roger is in a position to intervene. Although Roger 
is uninterested in the stranger’s well-being, he recognizes that he 
has been provided with a perfect opportunity to debilitate his 
rival. In the reasonable belief that doing so is necessary to protect 
the stranger, Roger grabs a nearby plank of wood and slams it into 
Rafa’s ankle. Roger’s entire purpose is to lame Rafa, though he 
knew that, by acting as he did, he would save the stranger. And 
Roger would not have struck Rafa had not the circumstances per-
mitted him also to save the stranger, thus providing Roger with 
the cover he needed to get away with injuring Rafa. We take this 
example to be analogous to the scenarios Kamm has in mind as 
permissible acts of war for the wrong reasons. Roger acted out of 
an evil intention, but he did so knowing that he would also 
accomplish a goal that would justify his harming Rafa, and on the 
condition that this other goal would be achieved.  
What does the law have to say about this case? The answer is 
unclear. Criminal and tort law both contain prohibitions against 
the intentional infliction of bodily harm. However, both bodies of 
law also recognize certain justifications that overcome these 
prohibitions – justifications that are commonly characterized as 
privileges. Particularly relevant is a universally recognized 
extension of the privilege of self-defense known as “defense of 
another.” It grants an actor a privilege intentionally to inflict 
bodily harm on another to defend an innocent third party from 
being killed or suffering serious injury at the hands of the other. If 
Samaritan (S) witnesses Assailant (A) attacking Victim (V), S is 
privileged to inflict physical harm on A, so long as S does so in the 
reasonable belief (or, in some jurisdictions, the good-faith belief) 
that doing so is necessary to protect V from imminent physical 
harm at the hands of A, and so long as S uses force in proportion 
to the threat posed to V. If S harms A under these conditions, S is 
not subject to criminal punishment or tort liability.4  
                                                           
4 The Model Penal Code and the Restatement of Torts are legal 
treatises that do not have the force of law, but are commonly invoked  
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Does the privilege to defend another extend to a case like 
Roger’s, in which the defendant acts out of a desire to harm the 
person against whom he uses force, but would not have acted 
unless he also knew that his use of force would protect a third 
party? Or is such a case an unprivileged attack that would subject 
Roger to punishment and/or liability? So far as we are aware, 
neither legislation nor judicial decisions provide a clear-cut 
answer to this specific question.5 Criminal punishment, if any, 
would probably be left to prosecutorial discretion (as to whether to 
pursue the case) and juror discretion (as to whether the attack 
falls within the privilege).6  Tort liability probably likewise would 
                                                                                                                                                 
by courts applying criminal and tort law, respectively. Subject to 
certain limitations omitted below, the Model Penal Code states that 
the use of force upon the person of another is justifiable to protect a 
third person when: “(a) the actor would be justified … in using such 
force to protect himself against the injury he believes to be threatened 
to the person whom he seeks to protect; and (b) under the 
circumstances as the actor believes them to be, the person whom he 
seeks to protect would be justified in using such protective force; and 
(c) the actor believe his intervention is necessary for the protection of 
such other person.” Model Penal Code § 3.05(a) (1962). In a similar 
fashion, the Second Restatement of Torts provides that if S 
reasonably believes that V would be privileged to use a certain degree 
force to defend himself against A’s attack, then S is privileged to use 
the same degree of force against A to defend V, so long as S’s use of 
force is necessary for the protection of V. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 76 (1965). 
5 The absence of relevant decisions is hardly surprising. See 
Lawrence Crocker, Justification and Bad Motives, 6 Oh. St. J. Crim. 
L. 277, 277 (2008) (observing that the issue is not likely to arise in 
real-world litigation because evidence as to a defendant’s motivations 
is unlikely to be available). 
6 Commentators have disagreed over whether and when an actor 
should be spared criminal punishment when reasons are present that 
suffice to render otherwise criminal conduct privileged, but the 
reasons are not those for which the actor acted. Compare Paul H. 
Robinson,  A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite 
to Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266, 285–87 (1975) (arguing 
that bad motives do not undermine otherwise justified acts) with 
George P. Fletcher, The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to 
Mr. Robinson, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 293, 320–21 (1975) (arguing that an 
actor’s being motivated by the reasons that would privilege his 
otherwise criminal act is necessary to render his act not merely “just” 
but “justified”) with Crocker, supra note 5, at 297 (arguing that it is 
unfair to convict a defendant who is aware of reasons justifying his  
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turn on juror discretion in determining the precise scope of the 
defendant’s privilege. We will therefore consider both the 
possibility that the privilege does and the possibility that it does 
not extend to such a case.  
 
1.1.1  The Gap Between Legal and Moral Permissibility 
Suppose the law were to deem Roger’s attack on Rafa 
permissible, thus deeming legally permissible individual conduct 
that meets Kamm’s test for the moral permissibility of a war such 
as Weden’s. The law’s doing so might seem to support Kamm’s 
judgment that analogous state action is morally permissible.  Yet 
one must be cautious about inferring moral permissibility from 
legal permissibility. Imagine that the saving of the stranger from 
Rafa’s attack was not a necessary condition for Roger’s actions – 
that Roger’s bitterness toward Rafa was so great that he would 
h a v e  a t t a c k e d  R a f a  e v e n  i f  n o  o c c a s i o n  t o  d o  s o  h a d  p r e s e n t e d  
itself. The presence of the occasion was, from Roger’s perspective, 
mere icing on the cake. This is a point at which, for Kamm, 
Roger’s actions might cross the line from morally permissible to 
impermissible, because the right reason for acting (saving the 
stranger) is no longer operating as a necessary condition of Roger’s 
action – he would have done it anyway. Yet so long as Roger used 
proportionate force and acted in the reasonable belief that the vic-
tim would be injured by Rafa’s attack if Roger did not intervene, 
Roger (we are presently supposing) is entitled to invoke the 
defense-of-others privilege. Thus, relative to the terms of Kamm’s 
moral analysis, the presumed legal permissibility of Roger’s attack 
might prove too much. The same laws that permit a use of force by 
Roger that meets Kamm’s stated conditions of moral 
permissibility would also permit uses of force that do not.  
Why would the law extend the defense-of-another privilege to 
give actors a license to act immorally? In fact, there are a variety 
of reasons that might justify legislatures and courts in refraining 
from rendering certain forms of immoral conduct illegal. They 
must worry, for example, about whether legal rules are stated in 
such a way as to require judges and jurors to draw speculative 
                                                                                                                                                 
actions but was not motivated by those reasons, primarily on the 
ground that the actor deserves credit for undertaking a justified act 
that he could have declined to undertake) with R.A. Duff, Rethinking 
Justifications, 39 Tulsa L. R. 829, 848–49 (2004) (arguing that ill-
motivated invocations of privileges should not be criminalized if the 
underlying conduct was required, but can fairly be criminalized if the 
underlying conduct was merely permissible). Thanks go to Ken 
Simons for pointing us toward this literature.  
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inferences. Thus although the law regularly requires judges and 
jurors to make determinations about actors’ intentions, the 
counterfactual inquiry into whether an actor’s knowledge of 
certain facts served as a necessary condition for his action, which 
Kamm regards as important to the determination of moral 
permissibility, might plausibly be deemed beyond their capacity. 
This is especially so for issues of self-defense and defense-of-
another, which tend to involve strangers making spur-of-the-
moment decisions under difficult conditions. Whereas lawmakers 
might fairly expect decision-makers to draw reasonably reliable 
inferences about certain mental states from circumstantial 
evidence, including inferences as to whether the defendant 
actually and reasonably believed his actions were necessary to 
defend another against imminent harm, it may be asking too 
much to expect them to infer reliably whether the defendant 
would have used force, even absent his ability to hide behind an 
adequate reason for using force.  
It is also common for judges to fashion legal rules with at least 
an eye on instrumental considerations. Courts might thus reject a 
too-fine inquiry into the role that certain reasons played in an 
actor’s decision-making out of a concern to encourage (or at least 
not discourage) acts in defense of others. In other words, the law 
might for consequentialist reasons err on the side of withholding 
punishment or liability for certain acts in defense of others that 
are in fact morally impermissible.  
In sum, even if the law were to grant Roger a privilege 
intentionally to injure Rafa on facts comparable to Kamm’s Weden 
example, it might nonetheless do so on terms and for reasons that 
run counter to Kamm’s judgment that such conduct is morally 
justified. Depending on the law’s justification(s) for granting the 
defense-of-another privilege, the (presumed) legal permissibility of 
Roger’s actions might tell us nothing about moral permissibility, 
or might attest to the immorality of an attack carried on terms 
comparable to those that would meet Kamm’s test of moral 
permissibility. This possibility – that legal permissibility actually 
points to moral impermissibility – will figure more prominently 
below in our discussion of the law of war.  
 
1.1.2   Provocation and Pretext  
Although we have been supposing until now that Roger’s 
attack is legally permissible, criminal and tort law recognize 
restrictions on the defense-of-another privilege that arguably 
point toward the rejection of its invocation in a Weden-like case. 
Most salient is the provocation exception to self-defense, which we  
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presume has equal application to cases of defense-of-another. 
(This is a plausible presumption, given that defense-of-another is 
generally understood as a special application of self-defense.7) An 
actor who first provokes an altercation, then, in the midst of it, 
uses force to defend himself against the other, often cannot claim 
self-defense as a justification for his use of force.8 Extending the 
same idea to the defense-of-another scenario, if Roger had 
somehow provoked Rafa into attacking the stranger, Roger might 
be ineligible to claim that his subsequent attack on Rafa would be 
privileged as the defense of another.  
This last variant on the Roger-Rafa example adds an element 
– the provocation – that is missing from the initial rendering of 
the Roger-Rafa example and Kamm’s Weden examples, and that 
could affect her assessment of the moral permissibility of Weden’s 
initiation of war.9 Even so, the provocation exception may not sit 
comfortably with Kamm’s analysis. Much depends on how “provo-
cation” is defined in criminal law, and on why criminal law treats 
provocation as undermining the self-defense and defense-of-
another privileges.  
                                                           
7 Model Penal Code §3.05(1)(a). 
8 The Model Penal Code regards provocation as defeating the 
privilege of self-defense only in cases in which the defendant claiming 
self-defense uses lethal force. Model Penal Code § 3.04(2)(b)(i). Many 
states apply the provocation rule to any instance of self-defense, 
whether involving lethal or non-lethal force. See, e.g., Texas Penal 
Code § 9.31(b)(4) (an actor is not justified in using physical force 
against another “if the actor provoked the other’s use or attempted 
use of unlawful force”). For application of the provocation exception to 
self-defense in a tort case, see Gortarez v. Smitty’s Super Valu, Inc. 
680 P.2d 807, 816 (Ariz. 1984). 
9 Even assuming that the law of provocation pertaining to the use 
of force by one person against another tracks plausible moral 
principles, it would not cut against Kamm’s position if Kamm could 
distinguish cases of provocation from cases in which a nation 
cynically takes advantage of a situation not of its own creation. For 
example, suppose Weden’s leaders somehow provoked Germany to 
launch a genocidal war against Norway just so that Weden would 
have the occasion to use military force against Germany to achieve an 
evil end such as the killing of German civilians, but that the leaders 
also knew that Weden’s intervention would prevent the genocide, and 
that they would not have intervened but for the fact that the 
intervention would prevent genocide. Would Kamm conclude that 
Weden’s cynical engineering of a just cause for war render the war 
morally impermissible?  
8 
 
One can imagine various ways in which a person might 
provoke a physical encounter. In ordinary usage, at least, the 
concept of provocation seems broad enough to encompass actions 
that are designed to induce a hostile response to actions that 
unintentionally and unforeseeably induce such a response.10 
Moreover, state criminal codes tend not to define with specificity 
what will suffice as the sort of provocation that undermines the 
self-defense privilege.11 But there is a particular kind of 
provocation that all courts probably regard as sufficient to 
undermine the privilege to use force to defend self and others,12 
and that some state laws explicitly treat as more significantly 
undermining the self-defense privilege than others.13 This is the 
kind of provocation that is intended by the provocateur to serve as 
a pretext for the use of force against the person being provoked. 
The Texas courts, for example, have interpreted that state’s 
criminal code – which provides simply that self-defense is 
unavailable to an actor “if the actor provoked [the victim’s] use or 
attempted use of unlawful force” – to focus on this special kind of 
provocation. According to them, a defendant “forfeits his right of 
self-defense” in cases in which he “provoked another to make an 
attack on him, so that the defendant would have a pretext for 
                                                           
10 Merely glancing at another in the ‘wrong way’ might provoke 
the other. It hardly follows, of course, that this sort of provocation 
should count against the provocateur when, for example, it comes to 
assessing her claim of self-defense. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, 
Provocateurs, 7 Crim. L. & Phil. 597, 610–13 (2013) (identifying 
different forms of provocation with differing implications for the 
justifiability of a provocateur’s subsequent use of force).  
11 Paul H. Robinson, Causing the Conditions of One’s Own 
Defense: A Study in the Limits of Theory in Criminal Law Doctrine, 
71 Va. L. Rev. 1, 4 n.11 (1985) (noting variations among states’ laws). 
12 Robinson, supra note 11, at 12 (noting that “many jurisdictions 
bar self-defense where the actor ‘provokes the use of force against 
himself with the intent to use such force as an excuse to inflict bodily 
harm upon the assailant’”) (quoting Georgia’s criminal code). For its 
part, the Model Penal Code states that provocation will undermine 
self-defense only for persons who provoke an occasion for the use of 
force “with the purpose of causing death or serious bodily injury.”). 
MPC § 3.04(2)(b)(i). 
13 Robinson, supra note 11, at 4 n.11 (pointing out that Illinois, 
Iowa, and Kansas treat pretextual provocations as more substantially 
limiting the provoker’s subsequent use of force than other forms of 
provocation).  
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killing the other under the guise of self-defense ….”14  In short, 
criminal law (in Texas and elsewhere) seems to treat pretextual 
provocations as paradigmatic of the sort of provocation that 
defeats an invocation of the privilege of self-defense. This feature 
of criminal law in turn at least suggests that pretextual acts of 
self-defense, as well as pretextual acts in defense of another, are 
morally suspect.  
We do not want to overstate the point. Even if there is a moral 
analog to the law’s provocation exception to the privilege to defend 
another, Kamm can distinguish the case of ill-motivated war with 
which she is concerned. As noted above, the provocation exception 
turns in part on the provoker’s actions having created the 
necessity for use of force, whereas Kamm’s examples involve 
situations in which the ill-intentioned nation merely takes 
advantage of, rather than manufacturing, a need for military 
intervention. Still, insofar as the courts’ focus on pretextual 
provocation is part of a broader inclination to deny the defense-of-
others privilege to those who invoke the privilege for self-serving 
reasons, it cuts against the general tenor of Kamm’s argument for 
the moral permissibility of actions such as Weden’s. And in fact 
there is some evidence in criminal and tort law of this broader 
concern.  
 
1.2.   Law’s Levels: Duty, Privilege, and Abuse of  
   Privilege   
The criminal and tort law of self-defense and defense of others 
operates within a three-step framework that sometimes shows up 
elsewhere within these bodies of law. Under this framework, the 
law first sets out relatively broad directives prohibiting certain 
forms of interaction with others. These directives generate legal 
duties to refrain from engaging in such interactions. For example, 
as noted above, both criminal and tort law contain directives 
specifying, roughly, that one may not intentionally touch another 
in a harmful manner. At the second level, the law identifies 
certain conditions under which an actor who breaches the relevant 
legal duty is spared liability or punishment (e.g., self-defense or 
defense of others). This is the inquiry into whether an actor is 
privileged to act in the way that he did. Finally, there is the third 
step – exemplified by the provocation doctrine – in which the law 
                                                           
14 Smith v. State, 965 S.W.2d 509, 512 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) 
(emphasis added) (interpreting Texas Penal Code § 9.31(b)(4)). Smith 
extends the same line of reasoning to uses of non-deadly force. Ibid. at 
512–13.  
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deems an otherwise applicable privilege unavailable to a 
particular actor, typically because of misconduct on the part of 
that actor. In this step, the question is whether the actor who 
claims privilege has “abused” the privilege, such that he forfeits 
his claim to it.  
This three-level structure is sometimes buried in the concepts 
and the categories of criminal and tort law.15  But it is also 
sometimes explicit. We can start with an example that is 
somewhat far afield, though still relevant.  
Suppose an employer asks a professor for a reference on a 
former student. The employer explains to the professor that the 
job is quite important, and that the well-being of many others 
hinges on the job being done well. Based on the professor’s 
misinterpretation of statements made by a colleague who also 
worked closely with the former student, the professor in her 
reference letter states her sincerely held belief that the former 
student is not qualified for the job because the former student has 
a drinking problem. In fact, the student has no such problem.  
The professor has libeled the student by falsely stating to the 
employer that the student has a drinking problem.16  The 
professor, however, will likely be spared liability. In the interest of 
promoting candid evaluations, defamation law has long recognized 
the so-called “common interest” privilege. It allows recommenders 
a certain margin for error with respect to defaming those whom 
they recommend.17 Even if the professor was careless as to the 
                                                           
15 Cf. George P. Fletcher, The Right and The Reasonable, 98 Harv. 
L. Rev. 949, 951–53 (1985) (observing that, in the U.S., criminal law 
often collapses into a general inquiry into “reasonableness” 
considerations that other legal systems would address under the 
heading of “abuse of right”). Although Fletcher’s article focuses on 
claimed justifications for use of force, it fails to note that criminal 
codes often isolate provocation as a distinct ground for deeming an 
actor’s use of force unjustified (apart from any unreasonableness on 
the part of the actor), and thus misses an instance in which U.S. law 
more closely tracks the multi-level framework he attributes to other 
systems. For an argument that abuse of right is embedded in a range 
of common-law doctrines, see Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A 
Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 Pac. L.J. 37 (1995). 
16 Roughly speaking, a statement is defamatory of a person if it 
attributes to a person attributes or actions that would tend to lower 
the esteem in which others hold that person. Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 559 (1965). 
17 See, e.g., Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., Inc., 569 A.2d 
793, 805 (N.J. 1990) (discussing the qualified privilege to defame in a  
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truth of her statement that the former student has a drinking 
problem, the student would not be entitled to recover in a suit 
against the professor because writers of references are privileged 
to defame as part of a good faith effort to provide a candid 
reference.  
Now change the facts of the case to bring it closer to the kind 
Kamm has in mind. Suppose the professor, who has always found 
the student irritatingly self-satisfied, knows the student is 
extremely keen to get the job. The professor also knows that the 
student is not qualified for it. However, rather than explaining in 
his letter to the employer why the student is unqualified, the 
professor knowingly and falsely writes that the student has a 
drinking problem. The professor does so for the malevolent 
satisfaction of seeing the student taken down a peg. But the 
professor would not have done so if she did not also know that the 
student was unqualified for the job, and that her letter would 
ensure that the student would not get the job. If the student were 
to sue the professor, a court following the law should reject the 
professor’s claim of a privilege to defame. This is because the 
privilege to defame another in the context of a recommendation is 
a “conditional” or “qualified” privilege. To say that it is conditional 
or qualified, as opposed to absolute, is to say that it is defeasible. 
Specifically, it is defeasible upon a showing that the person who 
seeks to invoke it has abused it.18 A quintessential form of abuse 
of privilege is a defamatory statement made knowingly, and out of 
malice toward the defamed person. A libel contained in a reference 
that is not part of a good faith effort to provide a reference is not 
privileged. The defendant will face liability because she violated 
her duty not to defame, and because her bad faith blocks her from 
establishing that she was privileged to defame.19  
                                                                                                                                                 
recommendation provided to a prospective employer of the defamed 
person). 
18 Ibid. at 806. James Goudkamp suggests that judicial decisions 
vacillate between treating non-maliciousness as an element of the 
privilege and treating it as a ground for defeating what would 
otherwise be a properly invoked privilege. James Goudkamp, Tort 
Law Defences (2013) 32–33. 
19 That the professor knew that the former student was not 
qualified for the job would have no bearing on the issue of the 
professor’s liability for defamation. However, the fact that the student 
was not qualified for the job might bear on the size of the student’s 
award of damages, in that the student arguably would not be entitled 
to claim that the professor’s defamation caused her to lose the 
financial upside of the new job.  
12 
 
As a related example of the same three-level framework, 
consider the so-called “paradox” of blackmail.20  Some have 
suggested that the criminal offense of blackmail involves a bit of 
alchemy, because it takes two perfectly permissible acts and 
somehow, by combining them, generates a wrongful act. In many 
instances, the blackmailer is at liberty to reveal damning true 
information about another person. And, the thought continues, 
there is nothing wrong with inviting another person to engage in a 
mutually beneficial transaction. So how can it be a crime for the 
blackmailer to invite his victim to pay the blackmailer in exchange 
for the blackmailer declining to exercise his ‘right’ to reveal the 
damning information?  
The answer may reside in attending to the duty / privilege / 
abuse-of-privilege framework.21 T h e r e  i s  i n  f a c t  n o  p a r a d o x .  
Defamation law starts with a duty to refrain from saying or 
writing things about another that tend to harm a person’s 
reputation. However, out of recognition of the value to society of 
true information being shared, the law privileges speakers to 
defame another through true statements. (True defamatory 
statements, are still defamatory in that they tend to harm 
reputation.) Still, the privilege to speak the truth is conditional or 
qualified – it can be lost for being abused. Exploiting the threat 
advantage one gains from possessing true defamatory information 
about another is an abuse of the privilege. There is no ‘right’ to 
spread true defamatory information about another, only a 
qualified privilege. Hence there is no mystery as to why blackmail 
is punishable as a crime – it involves an abuse (and loss) of 
privilege.  
A third example of the three-level framework involves the 
privilege to enforce one’s right to exclude others from one’s land. 
Although one is not ordinarily permitted intentionally to use force 
against another, one can use reasonable force in an effort to expel 
                                                           
20 See James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 
Colum. L. Rev. 670, 670–71 (1984) (stating the paradox); see also 
Mitchell Berman, The Evidentiary Theory of Blackmail: Taking 
Motives Seriously, 65 U. Chi. L. Rev. 795 (1998) (reviewing attempts 
to dispel the paradox, and offering an alternative ground for doing 
so); Henry Smith, The Harm in Blackmail, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 861 
(1998) (arguing that blackmail is criminalized because of the 
relatively high likelihood that blackmail victims will otherwise resort 
to violent forms of self-help). 
21 Perillo, supra note 15, at 93 (suggesting that blackmail is an 
abuse of the right of free speech, though without drawing on the law 
of defamation).  
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unpermitted entrants onto one’s property. Yet there are limits to 
the privilege, and it can be lost for being abused. A landowner who 
treats an innocent trespass – such as a trespass by mistake – as 
an occasion to engage his anti-social proclivities, might well find 
his claim of privilege denied.22 The law similarly gives landowners 
leeway to set up certain kinds of defenses to ward off anticipated 
trespassers. But a landowner who injures even a criminal 
trespasser by setting up a potentially deadly trap on his land 
merely to protect his land (as opposed to his person) will be 
deemed liable for having exceeded the scope of the privilege.23  
We have emphasized the duty / privilege / abuse-of-privilege 
framework because it helps to articulate some of our concerns 
about Kamm’s approach to the morality of initiating armed 
conflict. In her treatment of the Weden case and other cases, 
Kamm in effect collapses the three steps, treating the issue of 
intentions versus necessary conditions as going to the question of 
whether Weden has acted wrongfully. In doing so, she arguably 
runs together issues that are more appropriately addressed within 
a sequence.  
The premise of the three-level framework is that when one 
engages in certain kinds of actions – prototypically, intentionally 
injurious actions – one has some explaining to do. Under this 
framework, an action such as Roger’s attack on Rafa might well be 
deemed legally impermissible. There is, after all, a prohibition on 
the books against the sort of conduct in which the actor has 
engaged. It is only in this defensive context – not in the initial 
articulation of the relevant behavioral norms – that the issue of 
good and bad intentions is being addressed. The onus is on Roger 
to justify his presumptively wrongful conduct. Although the law 
offers a stock of privileges that actors can invoke to do so, when 
actors invoke them on grounds that don’t jibe with the reasons for 
having these privileges, they are unavailable. Again, in the 
language of the law, there has been an abuse of privilege. Prima 
                                                           
22 Cf. Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188 (Vt. 1908) (the plaintiffs moored 
their boat at the defendant’s private dock to gain shelter from a 
storm; even though their doing so was a trespass, and even though a 
landowner enjoys some leeway to use physical force to expel a 
trespasser who refuses to leave the owner’s property, the defendant 
was liable for exceeding the scope of the privilege by forcibly ejecting 
the plaintiffs so as to expose them to the storm). 
23 Katko v. Briney, 183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971) (property owner 
subject to punitive damages for using deadly force to fend off the 
plaintiff-trespasser).  
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facie wrongful conduct that cannot be justified is simply wrongful 
conduct.  
Of course Kamm does not maintain that the opportunistic 
manipulation of rules by an individual such as Roger, or the 
leaders of a nation such as Weden’s, is irrelevant to an assessment 
of their actions. It does not bear on the permissibility of their 
actions, she maintains, but it does bear on their character. Hence 
in her view we are entitled to think less of Roger and of Weden’s 
leaders, even though we cannot condemn their actions as 
wrongful. So what is to be said in favor of our suggestion, derived 
from the legal examples provided above, that opportunism bears 
on moral permissibility rather than character?  
One advantage is that it allows us to distinguish two 
hypotheticals that Kamm seems to regard as morally equivalent, 
but that strike us as calling for different treatment. Sweden, 
unlike Weden, starts a war against Germany for the purpose of 
halting genocide. However, it does so only because its leaders 
know that they will gain access to cheap oil that will help defray 
the cost of their efforts to stop the genocide. Kamm seems to think 
that Sweden and Weden are comparable instances of morally 
permissible conduct.24 Our judgment is that Sweden’s actions are 
quite different, precisely because Sweden’s actions do not involve 
an abuse of privilege in the senses mentioned above. Sweden is 
not opportunistically seizing on an excuse to do something that it 
knows would be wrongful except for the presence of a fortuity that 
enables it to clothe its wrongful act in the mantle of permissibility. 
Sweden is sincerely searching for a way to do the right thing.  
More generally, we would speculate that the duty / privilege / 
abuse-of-privilege framework may have certain structural 
advantages over Kamm’s ‘flatter’ moral framework. Insofar as 
legal and moral rules governing interpersonal interactions are 
meant to guide conduct, they probably do better to start with 
relatively clear and broad directives, then introduce qualifications 
and exceptions as such. A parent aiming to teach a child about 
impermissible ways of interacting with others presumably will do 
better by instructing the child not to hit others, rather than 
delving into how the existence of reasons that would justify hitting 
another might in fact justify hitting that other if they figure in 
certain ways in the child’s decision-making. Relatedly, a scheme of 
conduct-guiding rules probably stands a better chance of 
succeeding if persons subject to the rules internalize them. If the 
rules themselves endorse opportunistic forms of compliance such 
                                                           
24 Kamm, Ethics for Enemies, at 123.  
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as Roger’s or Weden’s, they might well inculcate an opportunistic 
attitude that renders the scheme of rules generally less 
efficacious.25 
We readily concede that these last points are speculative. Less 
speculative is our claim that criminal and tort law pertaining to 
an individual’s infliction of injury on another often adopts a 
framework in which legal permissibility requires not merely that 
good reasons for injuring exist, and not merely that those reasons 
play a causal role in the injurer’s decision to inflict injury, but 
further that the reasons figure in the actor’s decision-making in 
the right way. Insofar as legal rules of this sort are grounded in 
and attest to common moral sentiments – and admittedly 
contestable assumption – they probably cut against Kamm’s 
conclusion that Weden-like behavior is morally permissible.  
 
2.   Intentions and Permissible Use of Force in  
   International  Law   
 
2.1   Just War Theory and the Requirement of Right 
   Intention   
The conditions which make war between polities permissible 
have been the subject of inquiries dating back to the Bible, the law 
of Manu, the Hamurabi Code, and Greek and Roman law. Most 
influential on modern thought has been Catholic Just War Theory 
(JWT), first developed by St. Augustine in the fifth century as 
Christianity became the official religion of the Roman Empire, and 
further expounded by St. Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth 
century. The Canonists, Scholastics, and early modern writers 
(including the Protestants among them) all followed and 
developed the JWT tradition, and it remained the predominant 
framework for evaluating the permissible use of force between 
states (or their political equivalent of the time) until the 
eighteenth century. The JWT specified the conditions for morally 
permissible violence between states, and while a theological 
framework that was originally designed to make war compatible 
with Christian teachings, its tenets came to be viewed over time 
as a form of natural law and even positive law – the jus ad bellum.  
                                                           
25 Kamm allows that a given actor’s conduct might be deemed 
wrongful if his opportunistic behavior demonstrates a propensity to 
further rule-breaking and hence the possibility of further bad 
consequences following from the behavior. Ibid., 120. Our point does 
not concern the assessment of an individual actor’s conduct, but 
rather the viability of a scheme of legal or moral rules, understood as 
a scheme that aims to guide conduct.  
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JWT received different articulations by different writers, who 
often infused the doctrine with their own moral views or political 
inclinations. However, it is possible to summarize JWT’s 
requirements for permissible wars as follows: A war is morally 
just if it is 1) initiated by a proper authority (possibly with a 
public declaration); 2) fought for a just cause; 3) fought with the 
right intention; 4) has a reasonable prospect of success in 
achieving the just cause; 5) will do no more harm than is justified 
under the just cause; and 6) was taken as a last resort.26  
Views within JWT as to what counts as a just cause for war 
changed over time, and included causes ranging from defending 
against aggression, avenging an injury to the sovereign or his 
nationals, responding to a violation of international law, or 
collecting a debt. The requirement of right intention, too, received 
various formulations. Both Augustine and Aquinas equated right 
intention with Christian love for the enemy, and contemporary 
Christian writers, such as Paul Ramsey, continue this tradition. 
For others, right intention need not amount to love, but it does go 
to the mental state of the aggressor. A nation waging war must do 
so only for the sake of pursuing the just cause. Having a just cause 
is not enough if it is pursued for reasons such as cruelty, revenge, 
humiliation of the enemy, self-aggrandizement, or any other 
purpose that could not be considered just. The principle of just 
intention goes to the motivations of those prosecuting the war; and 
while it may well be that several motivations are at play, the right 
intention must be dominant if not exclusive.  
Clearly, Kamm’s Weden examples would not meet the criteria 
of traditional JWT. Even granting that prevention of genocide 
counts as a just cause for war, the predominance of Weden’s self-
interested reasons for intervention would violate the requirement 
of “right intention.” This result is hardly surprising, for Kamm is 
quite self-consciously aiming to depart from JWT by separating 
moral permissibility from good intentions.  
 
                                                           
26 In some formulations, there is a seventh condition of relative 
justice, according to which the just cause of one side exceeds any just 
claim of the other; in yet others, there is a requirement of striving for 
peace, distinct from the just cause. For more on the traditional JWT, 
see Just War Theory (Jean Bethke Elshtain, ed. 1992); Paul Ramsey, 
The Just War: Force and Political Responsibility (1968); James 
Turner Jonson, Ideology, Reason, and the Limitation of War: 
Religious and Secular Concepts (1981), 1200–1740; James Turner 
Johnson, Just War Tradition and the Restraint of War: A Moral and 
Historical Inquiry (1981).  
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2.2   Use of Force Under International Law  
Starting in the eighteenth century and continuing to the 
present time, the law of war has been reshaped in a ‘positivistic’ 
spirit that potentially draws a sharp divide between legality, on 
the one hand, and morality and justice, on the other. According to 
the now dominant framework, the legality of the use of military 
force no longer tracks the requirements of JWT, though some 
elements of JWT theory arguably still bear on legality. The 
explanations for this shift are various, but ultimately, wars came 
to be seen as matters of realpolitik: of a self-interested execution 
of politics through violence rather than actions subject to moral 
evaluation. Wars of expansion and self-aggrandizement were 
treated much the same as wars for self-defense. Efforts to regulate 
the resort to force among states remained sparse and limited. It 
was only in the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact that wars were deemed 
an unlawful instrument of politics.27  
With the failure of the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the lessons of 
the two World Wars, the United Nations Charter sought to once 
again articulate the conditions for permissible wars among states, 
to offer a modern jus ad bellum. The Charter set out a three-tiered 
regulation of the use of force: a general prohibition on any threat 
or use of force against the political independence or territorial 
integrity of another state (Article 2(4)); conferral on the Security 
Council, as the guardian of international peace and security, of 
the power to authorize the use of force, notwithstanding Article 
2(4) (Article 42); and an exceptional permission for unilateral 
action by a state exercising its “inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a 
[Member state]” (Article 51).  
The exact scope of the general prohibition on the use of force, 
the reach of the Security Council’s power to authorize the use of 
force, and the boundaries for a permissible unilateral exercise of 
self-defense by a state have all been hotly debated by scholars and 
policymakers ever since the adoption of the un Charter. What is 
fairly clear, however, is that the Charter abandons several of the 
JWT’s requirements for a morally just war.  
In fact, the only explicit condition of the JWT criteria that 
survives in the Charter is a narrow version of the just cause 
requirement – individual or collective self-defense in the face of an 
armed attack – and even then, only until the Security Council 
                                                           
27 General Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an Instrument 
of National Policy (Kellogg-Briand Pact), art. 1, Aug. 27, 1928, 46 
Stat. 2343, 94 L.N.T.S. 57.  
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“has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security.”28 Given this narrow statement of a just cause, it is 
small wonder that even the right to intervene on behalf of 
persecuted minorities within another state – Kamm’s premise of a 
just cause in the Weden case – has been hotly contested, with a 
majority of General Assembly members voting to prohibit such 
interventions absent a Security Council authorization.29  
One could argue that certain other features of JWT are given 
implicit recognition in the Charter. The general prohibition in 
Article 2(4), combined with the narrow exception in Article 51, can 
be understood as replicating the requirement that war be a last 
resort. And the International Court of Justice has stated that the 
requirement of proportionality is a customary norm that 
complements the language of Article 51 and remains a condition 
for any lawful war.30 The condition that the war be waged under 
the proper authority of a leader perhaps can be implied through 
its reference to sovereign state action.  
Clearly, however, the conditions of right intention and the 
probability of success have been abandoned under the Charter’s 
formulation of jus ad bellum. With regard to the latter, the right 
to self-defense under the Charter is seen as inherent to any state, 
and Article 51 suggests that a country facing aggression is 
permitted to use force even if it stands no chance of repelling the 
attack.31 As far as right intention goes, the Charter is 
conspicuously silent on the intention of the state acting in self-
defense or in the defense of others, and we are unaware of any 
case law that has added it to the language of Article 51 as a 
customary requirement. Even with regard to the general 
prohibition, stated in Article 2(4), which prohibits the threat or 
use of force “against the territorial integrity or political 
independence” of another state, most commentators agree that 
there does not need to be a specific intention to harm the 
territorial integrity or political independence of the target state, 
and that the prohibition encompasses any and all armed attacks 
on another state, whatever their motivation.32 Similarly, the 
                                                           
28 U.N. Charter, Article 51. 
29 General Assembly Resolution on the Responsibility to Protect. 
30  See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against 
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J., para. 176. (June 27). 
31 On the moral justification for war in self-defense by weak 
states, see Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument 
with Historical Illustrations (1991) [1977]. 
32 These terms then are meant only for emphasis, with the latter 
part of the Article – “or in any other manner inconsistent with the  
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United Nations General Assembly’s definition of “aggression” does 
not include any element of intention and focuses only on the 
purely objective question of whether a state is in fact under attack 
or threat of attack.33 To the extent intentions matter at all, they 
are useful only as a means to ascertain the existence of a just 
cause (for example, in evaluating the American invasion of Iraq in 
2003), or otherwise to ensure that a war was in fact necessary or 
proportionate, not as an independent legal condition.34  
In sum, even though Weden’s actions would be unjustified 
under JWT, they may be permissible under current international 
law. Indeed, if Weden’s war on Germany were held to be illegal 
under international law, it would be because the legality of 
unilateral humanitarian interventions is in doubt, not because of 
Weden’s ulterior motives in intervening.  
 
2.3   Humanitarian Interventions  
Humanitarian interventions have long been discussed in legal, 
moral, and political theory, but came to the fore with the 1999 
NATO Operation Allied Hope for Kosovo. Not having been 
authorized by the Security Council, the NATO operation sparked 
a heated debate over the right to intervene on behalf of an 
oppressed population. The legal challenge resided in the language 
of the Charter, which suggests that, unless a state is itself 
attacked or is coming to the aid of another state that is attacked, 
any lawful use of force must be authorized by the Security 
Council. Those advocating a right to intervene argued for a pur-
posive reading of the Charter, by which “collective self-defense” 
should be understood not only to encompass aiding in the defense 
of another member state but also aiding a persecuted population 
within another state.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Purposes of the United Nations” – controlling. See Yoram Dinstein, 
War, Aggression, and Self-Defence 87 (4th ed., 2005). 
33 See G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), 29th Sess., Art. 3, (Dec. 14, 1974). 
34 In the application brought by Nicaragua against American 
armed intervention in its territory, the ICJ sought to ascertain the 
intentions of the United States in its support for the Contras for the 
purposes of establishing whether there was in fact an armed 
intervention by the U.S. in Nicaragua’s internal affairs and whether 
such intervention could have been justified under the cause of self-
defense; see Nicar. v. U.S., supra note 30, para. 241. It is also possible 
that intentions play a role in determining the permissible 
employment of armed reprisals. Because the legality of armed 
reprisals is subject to much controversy, we bracket this issue.  
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In response to the UN Secretary General’s challenge, the 
Canadian government sponsored an expert study which yielded 
the 2001 Report of the International Commission on Intervention 
and State Sovereignty. The Report found that the Kosovo 
operation was “illegal but legitimate” and sought to lay out the 
conditions for future humanitarian interventions, or in its new 
language, the exercise of the “Responsibility to Protect.”35  Giving 
clear priority to interventions under the umbrella of the Security 
Council, the Report nonetheless left the door open to other 
interventions (preferably, multilateral) in cases in which the 
Security Council failed to act, provided such interventions meet a 
number of conditions. Among them, the Report listed “right 
intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever 
other motives intervening states may have, must be to halt or 
avert human suffering.”36 The Report later explained that 
obviously, there may well be more than one intention at play, and 
then added:  
 
Moreover, the budgetary cost and risk to personnel involved in 
any military action may in fact make it politically imperative 
for the intervening state to be able to claim some degree of 
self-interest in the intervention, however altruistic its primary 
motive might actually be. Apart from economic or strategic 
interests, that self-interest could, for example, take the 
understandable form of a concern to avoid refugee outflows, or 
a haven for drug producers or terrorists, developing in one’s 
neighbourhood.37  
 
Note that under this formulation, the act of war in Kamm’s Weden 
case would still be legally impermissible, whereas the act of war in 
Sweden’s case would pass muster.  
For all its good intentions, the International Commission’s 
Report was subsequently rejected by the UN General Assembly. In 
its 2005 World Summit Outcome Resolution, the General 
Assembly considered the Responsibility to Protect as a 
justification for armed intervention, and held that any external 
intervention must be subject to a Security Council’s 
                                                           
35  International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect (2001), XII, available at  
http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf.  
36 Ibid., 35. 
37 Ibid., 36.  
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authorization.38  The category of “illegal but legitimate” was thus 
rejected by the Member States in favor of the strict regime for the 
use of force as set out by the Charter.  
We see therefore that a war, such as a humanitarian 
intervention, which is genuinely pursued for the sake of the 
persecuted population, may be just under the traditional JWT, but 
illegal under international law. There may also be cases in which 
a lawful war would be deemed unjust under the JWT, such as 
when a state exploits an armed attack by the adversary to fulfill 
ambitions other than its most immediate security interests.  
What is important in the present context is that if the 
humanitarian plight of an oppressed population is considered a 
just cause for the unilateral use of force (Kamm’s Weden case), the 
Charter – unlike the International Commission’s Report – would 
not require that the motivations of the intervening state be pure. 
In this sense, the Charter and Kamm are perfectly aligned in their 
departure from the JWT and the requirement of right intention.  
 
2.4   The Law and Morality of War  
Why is it the case that the modern jus ad bellum has 
abandoned the requirement of right intention? What might 
explain a possible discrepancy between the law and ethics of war?  
One possible reason for relying on a relatively objective just-
cause criterion – the existence of an attack – rather than on the 
intentions of those using force, lies in the difficulty of ascertaining 
intentions. States do not act; individuals do, and their intentions 
are frequently difficult to gauge. Even for an individual actor, 
multiple intentions may be at work. With respect to political 
decisions to use military force, a complex of intentions held by 
multiple persons in positions of power will have to be assessed. 
And matters only get more complicated when the use of force is 
carried out not by one state alone, but by a coalition of states, such 
as in the case of the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Eviden-
tiary explanations of this sort appear regularly in the literature 
discussing modern international law’s jettisoning of the 
requirement of right intention under JWT.39  
While there is surely something to the evidentiary 
explanation, we do not believe it is the entire story. As others have 
                                                           
38 2005 World Summit Outcome, GA Res. 60/1 ¶¶ 138–139. (Oct. 
24, 2005). 
39 See the entry “war” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/#2 (“International law does not 
include [the rule of right intention], probably because of the 
evidentiary difficulties involved in determining a state’s intent.”)  
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observed, “[i]ntentions are neither infinitely redescribable nor 
irreducibly private.”40 They can and ought to be deduced from a 
careful examination of publicly available information and logical 
inference. Indeed, in numerous other instances international law 
does concern itself with states’ intentions (for instance, in 
determining responsibility for international wrongful acts). In 
short, the evidentiary problem is a challenge, but not an 
insurmountable one.  
A more convincing explanation, we believe, is the modern jus 
ad bellum’s preference for peace over justice, i.e., for the overall 
stability of the international system over change that justice may 
demand.41 The UN Charter’s preference for peace and stability is 
evident from the significant constriction of what amounts to a just 
cause for war (absent Security Council Authorization), from the 
absolute protection given to existing international boundaries, and 
from the Charter’s Preamble that states as its purpose “to save 
succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in 
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.”42  To fulfill 
the mission of international peace, so the drafters of the Charter 
believed, some sacrifice of justice is inevitable, including 
authorization of use of force for any purpose other than fending off 
aggression, regardless of the good intentions behind it.  
By the same token, the inherent right to self-defense was 
elevated to a paramount state interest. If stability on the 
international system is to be maintained, absent a central 
adjudicating or enforcing power, state sovereignty must be 
ensured through some measure of self-help. Just as there is no 
requirement that the defense against aggression stands a 
reasonable prospect of success, so too the defending state need not 
justify its actions by reference to its reasons for acting; it is 
enough that it is defending itself against an attacker. The jus ad 
bellum thus creates something akin to a strict liability regime, 
where only the acts of the attacker and defender count, not their 
intentions. In so doing, it seeks to reduce the incentives for any 
first attack, allowing the target state to exploit the opportunity 
and engage in a counteroffensive for whatever reasons it wishes 
to.  
 
                                                           
40 Brian Orend, Michael Walzer on Resorting to Force, 3 Canadian 
J. Pol. Sci. 523, 532 (2000). 
41 On the UN Charter’s preference for peace over justice, see 
Gabriella Blum, States’ Crime and Punishment, 38 Yale. J. Int’l L. 57, 
62–92 (2013). 
42 UN Charter, Preamble.  
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Ignoring intentions for the sake of peace and stability may or 
may not be a legitimate tradeoff and may or may not promote 
peace in practice. We do not engage these questions here. The 
important point is that, unlike the JWT, the Charter never set out 
to offer a moral prescription for war, only a legal consequentialist 
framework for the goal of peace. The fact that the Weden case 
might be considered lawful under the Charter (if the plight of 
oppressed populations was considered an “armed attack”) tells us 
little about the justness of the war. And Kamm, after all, is 
interested in justice, not peace.  
In sum, the modern law of war presents something of a 
paradox. A well-intentioned humanitarian war might well be 
illegal, whereas an ill-intentioned war will be legal so long as the 
objective conditions for a just war (i.e., an attack or perhaps even 
a threat of attack43) are present. One might suppose this paradox 
cuts in favor of Kamm’s analysis of the moral permissibility of 
war, given that modern law seems prepared to deem permissible 
some wars born of bad intentions. But the inference is 
unwarranted, for two reasons. First, and more narrowly, the 
terms of legal permissibility likely do not track Kamm’s account of 
moral permissibility. As just noted, the compelling humanitarian 
reason for intervention in which Weden’s leaders clothe their self-
interested attack would not actuall y  s u f f i c e  t o  r e n d e r  i t  l e g a l l y  
permissible. Second, and more generally, international law’s focus 
on criteria other than states’ intentions – particularly when 
considered in light of its self-conscious refusal to incorporate the 
principles of JWT – suggests that it prioritizes the maintenance of 
peace and stability over the determination of right and wrong. 
This brings us back to a point raised earlier, in our discussion of 
individuals’ use of force. Sometimes the law deems actions 
permissible on institutional and pragmatic grounds. That it might 
for these sorts of reasons permit persons and nations to engage in 
ill-intentioned uses of force does not give rise to an inference as to 
the moral permissibility of those uses. Indeed, because the law in 
these instances is regulating conduct on terms that indicate it will 
tolerate immoral conduct for the sake of advancing other goals, 
legal permissibility might even point toward moral 
impermissibility.  
                                                           
43 The legality of preemptive use of force in the face of an 
imminent attack is subject to at least as much debate as the legality 
of humanitarian interventions, and turns on many of the same 
considerations, including the language of the Charter and the goals of 
peace and stability of the international system.  
 